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埃克森美孚搞定1萬億美元石油財富的幕后故事

埃克森美孚控制著圭亞那110億桶可開采石油地塊,按當前價格計算價值近1萬億美元。

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圖片來源:JAMES LEYNSE—CORBIS VIA GETTY IMAGES

斯科特·戴克斯特豪斯堅信自己的看法。或者這么說,在預測3英里以下的海底時,他向來信心滿滿。當年32歲的戴克斯特豪斯是埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)的地球科學家,他認為圭亞那海岸附近,大西洋與加勒比海交界處很可能蘊藏著大量石油。然而困難也正在于此。他不得不說服老板鉆井證明自己的推測。“風險很高,”戴克斯特豪斯說,“但圭亞那這個賭場值得下注,因為一旦成功,利潤會很高。”

2013年底,去圭亞那挖石油實在不是埃克森美孚的重點。在此之前公司在該地區已經鉆出40多口干井。目標地層在一英里深的水下,起名為Liza,這是當地一種魚的名字,鉆探成本至少1.75億美元。據戴克斯特豪斯估計,成功幾率只有五分之一。但如果他賭對了,石油勘探的前沿將就此拓展,因為這能證明全世界儲量最大的委內瑞拉儲油地層延伸到了南美洲北海岸。埃克森美孚很多人沒興趣打賭,石油行業其他公司也興趣不大。

如今,Liza已成為20多年來全球最大的石油勘探發現。埃克森美孚控制的地塊有110億桶可開采石油,按當前價格計算價值近1萬億美元。這一發現使圭亞那從南美洲最窮國搖身一變成為到2027年人均原油產量將超過沙特阿拉伯或科威特的國家。屆時圭亞那石油產量有望排名南美第二,超過委內瑞拉僅次于巴西。

疫情之后,圭亞那變成德州石油巨頭埃克森美孚復興的基石。埃克森美孚掌握著圭亞那油田45%的份額,每桶生產成本低于35美元,是歐佩克以外利潤最高的油田之一。目前原油交易價格為每桶85美元,即便從化石燃料轉型導致需求崩潰價格減半,油田也會賺錢。

從圭亞那油井背后不為人知的故事,能看出一些關于石油過去和未來令人驚訝的真相,相關細節主要來自對十幾位曾參與Liza油井勘探人士的采訪,其中多數人后來已離開公司。從中可看出業內不少人高估了從石油到可再生能源轉型的速度。就在三年前,埃克森美孚在董事會席位爭奪戰中還輸給了激進投資者,對方認為埃克森美孚為轉型做的準備很不夠。埃克森美孚則堅持核心業務。“其他同行后退之際,我們卻在前進,”埃克森美孚生產部門總裁利亞姆·馬龍說。2019年底圭亞那生產啟動以來,公司股價已翻了一番多,在同行巨頭中回報率最高。

這段歷史表明,依靠市場力量終結化石燃料非常困難。綠色環保運動曾希望更先進的技術能推動太陽能、風能和其他可再生能源取代勘探難度越發增加的石油。現在環保主義者擔心,埃克森美孚利用能源轉型放緩獲得意外之財,而鉆井對氣候和圭亞那生態造成的損害都轉嫁到其他公司頭上。“埃克森美孚污染了海洋和大氣,卻不必付出代價,”從事國際環境保護工作的圭亞那律師梅琳達·揚基說。(埃克森美孚表示會投資環保技術,達到甚至超過了監管要求。)

埃克森美孚的競爭對手們顯然痛心疾首。包括雪佛龍(Chevron)在內近30家其他公司放棄了投資圭亞那的機會。殼牌(Shell)曾持有50%份額,后來退出。雪佛龍以530億美元收購了赫斯公司(Hess Corp.),因為該公司持有30%份額,是埃克森美孚在圭亞那的兩個合作伙伴之一。今年埃克森美孚對赫斯收購案提起仲裁,聲稱對其股份有優先收購權。(赫斯公司表示,相關權利并不適用于收購。)

但圭亞那故事的關鍵并不是為獲取巨大回報承擔傳奇風險。從實際情況來看,埃克森美孚既是石油勘探公司,也是金融工程公司。公司對沖了賭注,降低了風險敞口,還購買了期權,利用可能性很小的結果賺了一筆。

追溯戰略緣起,還要看2013年一個關鍵時刻。當時埃克森美孚的頂尖地球科學家得出結論稱,戴克斯特豪斯和同事們沒能證明鉆探Liza值得冒險。戴克斯特豪斯很沮喪。如果不鉆探,埃克森美孚就得在幾個月內將斯塔布魯克區塊或特許權(也就是該地區勘探和鉆探的許可證)歸還圭亞那政府。(斯塔布魯克是圭亞那首都喬治敦的原名。)

會議結束后的走廊里,商業顧問魯迪·迪斯穆克將一位地球科學家拉到一旁,問道:“如果鉆井免費,你會支持Liza嗎?” 這位地球科學家回答:“當然!”

為此,一小群中低層員工想出了免費鉆井的方法。或者可以說接近免費。

跟很多地球科學家一樣,羅德·林伯特一直很清楚在大西洋深處,委內瑞拉石油的源巖,也就是拉盧納地層一直延伸到圭亞那、蘇里南和法屬圭亞那的海洋領土。20世紀60年代,蘇里南村民在校園里鉆井時意外發現了一個儲量十億桶的油田,這位心直口快的澳大利亞人立刻著了迷。

林伯特認為,校園里的石油起源于圭亞那大陸架,而且在數百萬年的時間里向陸地遷移了100多英里。1997年年中,他向負責勘探新盆地的埃克森美孚團隊提出了這一想法。“演講結束時團隊只得到一張大拇指向下的照片,”林伯特說。但他還是聯系了圭亞那政府爭取鉆井權。“我沒有告訴任何人,”他說。

1997年,圭亞那仍然深陷于強人福布斯·伯納姆的社會主義和孤立主義政策,是南美洲最貧窮的國家之一。1966年圭亞那脫離英國獨立后不久,伯納姆便上臺執政。林伯特和兩名同事從休斯頓飛往喬治敦,獲取舊的鉆井記錄,與圭亞那地質和礦業委員會討論爭取鉆探權的可能。“那里的一層真就是最底層,”伯納姆說,“我的意思是桌子和椅子在土里。”

埃克森美孚團隊還會見了圭亞那總統塞繆爾·辛德斯,他只喜歡談圭亞那流行的板球。“我沒急著談生意,因為我沒權力做事,”林伯特說。返回德州提供新數據后,林伯特獲得授權開始談判勘探權合同。

林伯特舉出大量油井勘探失敗的例子,推動并最終簽下了條件非常有利的合同。埃克森美孚獲得的斯塔布魯克地塊比墨西哥灣石油地塊平均面積大1000多倍。合同規定不用預付款,如果埃克森美孚真的開采出石油,可在扣除成本后保留50%的利潤。公司只用向政府支付1%的特許權使用費。后來圭亞那政府因這份合同受到嚴厲批評。“一段時間以來,我一直在捫心自問,但覺得自己沒有做錯,”林伯特說,“按照當時我們了解的情況以及未知狀況來說,合同并無不妥。”

另一方面,這筆交易確實幫助了政府。圭亞那與東邊的蘇里南和西邊的委內瑞拉都存在嚴重的邊界爭端。與埃克森美孚結盟意味著與圭亞那為敵就是與全世界最強大的石油公司為敵。

圭亞那的擔心也不無道理。蘇里南炮艦曾將另一家石油勘探公司驅離兩國有爭議的水域。有八年時間,埃克森美孚無法在該地塊勘探。2007年蘇里南沖突快要解決時,埃克森美孚的高管們才發現還要出資研究地震才能滿足合同要求。高管們建議放棄該地塊,騰出現金給巴西、墨西哥灣和美國新興頁巖盆地更重要的勘探工作。

工程師迪斯穆克曾在德州接受教育,當時擔任埃克森美孚西半球商業顧問,看到與圭亞那簽署的合同后他簡直不敢相信自己的眼睛。林伯特談判達成的協議對公司非常有利。迪斯穆克和同事提出了一項外包協議,將部分地塊轉給愿意為地震研究付費的公司。埃克森美孚的管理層批準了,2008年將斯塔布魯克25%的份額賣給了殼牌。接下來三年里埃克森美孚和殼牌解讀了從地下巖層反彈的地震波從而了解當地的地質情況。初步獲得的數據很樂觀,跡象顯示存在化石燃料。

但數據也證實了很多地球科學家最擔心的問題:完全沒有構造圈閉。構造圈閉是指地質斷層或非常堅固的巖石帶,就像大壩一樣,石油經過數百萬年滲入沉積層時可將其捕獲。如果沒有堅固的圈閉層,石油就無法大量積聚,也就沒有商業價值。圭亞那只有地層圈閉,對石油勘探來說在所有地質構造中風險最大。雖然地層圈閉很安全,但不容易發現,很難在地震圖上分析。而且這種構造通常包含所謂的 "盜油區",石油可能從中漏出。

到了2000年代末期,石油行業開始熱衷勘探地層圈閉。當時原油價格超過每桶100美元,如果能有大發現就意味著巨額利潤。技術也在不斷進步。殼牌決定將在斯塔布魯克地塊的份額增加到 50%。大約同一時間,休斯頓一家小型勘探公司APA(當時還叫阿帕奇)兩位地球科學家也在密切關注著相關消息。 上世紀90年代蒂姆·奇索姆曾在埃克森美孚研究過委內瑞拉,而巴勃羅·艾斯納在西班牙雷普索爾工作時曾常駐該地區。兩人都想去斯塔布魯克分一杯羹,發現沒機會后,就帶阿帕奇公司進入了蘇里南。

還沒來得及鉆井,阿帕奇公司管理層改變主意裁撤了勘探團隊。不到半小時奇索姆和艾斯納就遭解雇。奇索姆去了赫斯,艾斯納則加入了中海油。兩人都感覺有工作沒做完。

2013年,員工人數達7.5萬的埃克森美孚只有一位地球科學家全職負責圭亞那。殼牌資助的地震研究提供了大量數據。埃克森請澳大利亞地球科學家戴克斯特豪斯協助解讀。他說,大學時就很熱愛這一學科,因為 "涵蓋了所有科學領域",包括地震建模物理學和研究數百萬年前生物的古生物學。"最后研究石油和天然氣,就會面臨真金白銀的決策,"他說。

從墨爾本抵達休斯頓后不久,戴克斯特豪斯就要做決策了。彼時埃克森美孚持有斯塔布魯克十多年,為了要不要在面積堪比馬薩諸塞州的某處打下直徑8英寸的鉆孔已糾結數月。

種種跡象顯示沒必要。埃克森更重視已發現石油的地方,而殼牌在法屬圭亞那鉆探失敗后,對當地也興趣漸失。戴克斯特豪斯開始分析約五年前獲得的二維地震數據。一處名叫Liza的勘探區引起了注意。從數據來看存在流體。是什么流體?是水還是石油?他的上司就不確定性不斷提出挑戰。

通過復雜的計算機建模,戴克斯特豪斯綜合了300多張三維地震圖像,認為很可能是水面上的石油。"研究越多,我越是覺得'那里有東西',”戴克斯特豪斯說。2013年底,他和兩位同事向埃克森十多位頂級地球科學家展示了發現。

好消息是,Liza有90米(295英尺)厚的 "含油層",里面布滿了多孔的沙子,流體很容易通過。他們估計可能石油含量可能有8.9億桶,當時價值近10億美元。預測上限是這一數字的兩倍。壞消息是成功幾率只有22%,主要原因是Liza是地層圈閉。老板并未認可,三人只得鎩羽而歸。

會上坐在后排的迪斯穆克看法有所不同。“我當時想,如果圈閉勘探成功,按照條件非常有利的合同還能繼續勘探600萬英畝的地塊,”他說。他制定了跟2008年類似的計劃,即尋找愿意為油井勘探支付大量資金換取份額的合作伙伴,從而降低財務損失。當然,如果埃克森美孚沒把風險分出去,現在賺得只會得多。埃克森美孚石油生產主管馬龍表示,公司機會很多,沒必要在一口井上押數億美元。“不能光說不練,”他說,“到底是對還是錯?都是基于當時了解的情況做的決定。”

管理層批準后,埃克森美孚迅速在休斯頓的Greenspoint辦公室成立數據室,邀請了約30家石油公司,大概20家出席。各利益相關方的地球科學家坐了整整一天聽埃克森美孚團隊介紹,第二天又分析了數據。赫斯最后一個表示贊成。奇索姆盤問了戴克斯特豪斯兩個多小時。“他做得很好,沒有夸大其詞,”2020年奇澤姆在的一次演講中提到,“對我來說,這一點非常重要。他真的充滿熱情。”

2014年年中,赫斯正考慮投資該地塊時,殼牌拋出了重磅炸彈:為地震數據支付了六年費用后,這家超級巨頭想退出。殼牌回答提問時表示,做出這一決定是因為“對前沿勘探資產采取了廣泛審查”。此時埃克森美孚擁有斯塔布魯克100%的份額,距離通知圭亞那政府鉆探與否只剩下幾周時間。

在赫斯內部,投資圭亞那的決定很難推動,但最終該公司同意持有30%。“我把職業生涯都賭上了,”奇索姆說,“如果沒成功,我肯定會被炒魷魚。”

早在阿帕奇與奇索姆共事時,艾斯納就對圭亞那垂涎三尺,此時他已加入中海油。"各方都有機會投資斯塔布魯克,但需要見解獨特且頭腦靈活的地質學家拍板,甚至把桌子砸了喊'贊成',"他說。“在中海油,我就是這樣的角色。”艾斯納說服了老板,中海油買下25% 的份額。埃克森在斯塔布魯克的份額降到45%,但關鍵的是,兩家新加入的公司同意承擔油井大部分成本。由于埃克森美孚資金安全無虞,管理層同意鉆探Liza。

這口油井耗資2.25億美元。盡管到最后埃克森將在圭亞那項目的投資達250多億美元,但熟悉內情的人士稱,埃克森最初的支出,也就是確保對該重大發現享有控制權的支出與2013年相信圭亞那潛力的一群人提出的零支出非常接近,只花了不到1億美元。實際可能還不到這個數字。

埃克森請了泛洋鉆探設備公司(Transocean Ltd.)的 "深水冠軍 "鉆井平臺。這臺高規格的鉆機長度堪比兩個足球場,可裝載10卡車的水泥和泥漿,鉆井深度超過7英里。直升機機組和支援船只隨時待命,所以油井每天成本很快就超過100萬美元。

在埃克森內部,這口油井被稱為 "地獄之井"。一段管道卡住沒法上下移動,影響了整座油井。鉆井工人只得切斷鉆頭,用水泥填滿井底。過程中損失了價值超過1500萬美元的設備。但鉆探人員打出一個側鉆孔,挽救了整個項目。在 Liza正式開鉆前一天晚上,戴克斯特豪斯和同事在埃克森新建的休斯頓園區兩間會議室里席地而睡。

2015年5月5日,鉆頭扎進Liza,休斯頓的實時油井數據顯示巖石密度出現突變。這意味著Liza井下有大量化石燃料。但當時還不清楚是石油還是天然氣。要想真正成功,必須是石油。

幾個小時后,“深水冠軍“鉆井平臺的甲板上泥漿循環,不斷把石頭甩到傳送帶上。戴克斯特豪斯的老板,也是資深地球科學家凱里·莫蘭德突然在咸咸的海風中聞到一股熟悉的氣息。“有點像加油站的味道,”她說。她戴上手套,撿起了一些石頭。石頭上,烏黑的石油滴滴滑落。(財富中文網)

譯者:梁宇

審校:夏林

斯科特·戴克斯特豪斯堅信自己的看法。或者這么說,在預測3英里以下的海底時,他向來信心滿滿。當年32歲的戴克斯特豪斯是埃克森美孚(Exxon Mobil)的地球科學家,他認為圭亞那海岸附近,大西洋與加勒比海交界處很可能蘊藏著大量石油。然而困難也正在于此。他不得不說服老板鉆井證明自己的推測。“風險很高,”戴克斯特豪斯說,“但圭亞那這個賭場值得下注,因為一旦成功,利潤會很高。”

2013年底,去圭亞那挖石油實在不是埃克森美孚的重點。在此之前公司在該地區已經鉆出40多口干井。目標地層在一英里深的水下,起名為Liza,這是當地一種魚的名字,鉆探成本至少1.75億美元。據戴克斯特豪斯估計,成功幾率只有五分之一。但如果他賭對了,石油勘探的前沿將就此拓展,因為這能證明全世界儲量最大的委內瑞拉儲油地層延伸到了南美洲北海岸。埃克森美孚很多人沒興趣打賭,石油行業其他公司也興趣不大。

如今,Liza已成為20多年來全球最大的石油勘探發現。埃克森美孚控制的地塊有110億桶可開采石油,按當前價格計算價值近1萬億美元。這一發現使圭亞那從南美洲最窮國搖身一變成為到2027年人均原油產量將超過沙特阿拉伯或科威特的國家。屆時圭亞那石油產量有望排名南美第二,超過委內瑞拉僅次于巴西。

疫情之后,圭亞那變成德州石油巨頭埃克森美孚復興的基石。埃克森美孚掌握著圭亞那油田45%的份額,每桶生產成本低于35美元,是歐佩克以外利潤最高的油田之一。目前原油交易價格為每桶85美元,即便從化石燃料轉型導致需求崩潰價格減半,油田也會賺錢。

從圭亞那油井背后不為人知的故事,能看出一些關于石油過去和未來令人驚訝的真相,相關細節主要來自對十幾位曾參與Liza油井勘探人士的采訪,其中多數人后來已離開公司。從中可看出業內不少人高估了從石油到可再生能源轉型的速度。就在三年前,埃克森美孚在董事會席位爭奪戰中還輸給了激進投資者,對方認為埃克森美孚為轉型做的準備很不夠。埃克森美孚則堅持核心業務。“其他同行后退之際,我們卻在前進,”埃克森美孚生產部門總裁利亞姆·馬龍說。2019年底圭亞那生產啟動以來,公司股價已翻了一番多,在同行巨頭中回報率最高。

這段歷史表明,依靠市場力量終結化石燃料非常困難。綠色環保運動曾希望更先進的技術能推動太陽能、風能和其他可再生能源取代勘探難度越發增加的石油。現在環保主義者擔心,埃克森美孚利用能源轉型放緩獲得意外之財,而鉆井對氣候和圭亞那生態造成的損害都轉嫁到其他公司頭上。“埃克森美孚污染了海洋和大氣,卻不必付出代價,”從事國際環境保護工作的圭亞那律師梅琳達·揚基說。(埃克森美孚表示會投資環保技術,達到甚至超過了監管要求。)

埃克森美孚的競爭對手們顯然痛心疾首。包括雪佛龍(Chevron)在內近30家其他公司放棄了投資圭亞那的機會。殼牌(Shell)曾持有50%份額,后來退出。雪佛龍以530億美元收購了赫斯公司(Hess Corp.),因為該公司持有30%份額,是埃克森美孚在圭亞那的兩個合作伙伴之一。今年埃克森美孚對赫斯收購案提起仲裁,聲稱對其股份有優先收購權。(赫斯公司表示,相關權利并不適用于收購。)

但圭亞那故事的關鍵并不是為獲取巨大回報承擔傳奇風險。從實際情況來看,埃克森美孚既是石油勘探公司,也是金融工程公司。公司對沖了賭注,降低了風險敞口,還購買了期權,利用可能性很小的結果賺了一筆。

追溯戰略緣起,還要看2013年一個關鍵時刻。當時埃克森美孚的頂尖地球科學家得出結論稱,戴克斯特豪斯和同事們沒能證明鉆探Liza值得冒險。戴克斯特豪斯很沮喪。如果不鉆探,埃克森美孚就得在幾個月內將斯塔布魯克區塊或特許權(也就是該地區勘探和鉆探的許可證)歸還圭亞那政府。(斯塔布魯克是圭亞那首都喬治敦的原名。)

會議結束后的走廊里,商業顧問魯迪·迪斯穆克將一位地球科學家拉到一旁,問道:“如果鉆井免費,你會支持Liza嗎?” 這位地球科學家回答:“當然!”

為此,一小群中低層員工想出了免費鉆井的方法。或者可以說接近免費。

跟很多地球科學家一樣,羅德·林伯特一直很清楚在大西洋深處,委內瑞拉石油的源巖,也就是拉盧納地層一直延伸到圭亞那、蘇里南和法屬圭亞那的海洋領土。20世紀60年代,蘇里南村民在校園里鉆井時意外發現了一個儲量十億桶的油田,這位心直口快的澳大利亞人立刻著了迷。

林伯特認為,校園里的石油起源于圭亞那大陸架,而且在數百萬年的時間里向陸地遷移了100多英里。1997年年中,他向負責勘探新盆地的埃克森美孚團隊提出了這一想法。“演講結束時團隊只得到一張大拇指向下的照片,”林伯特說。但他還是聯系了圭亞那政府爭取鉆井權。“我沒有告訴任何人,”他說。

1997年,圭亞那仍然深陷于強人福布斯·伯納姆的社會主義和孤立主義政策,是南美洲最貧窮的國家之一。1966年圭亞那脫離英國獨立后不久,伯納姆便上臺執政。林伯特和兩名同事從休斯頓飛往喬治敦,獲取舊的鉆井記錄,與圭亞那地質和礦業委員會討論爭取鉆探權的可能。“那里的一層真就是最底層,”伯納姆說,“我的意思是桌子和椅子在土里。”

埃克森美孚團隊還會見了圭亞那總統塞繆爾·辛德斯,他只喜歡談圭亞那流行的板球。“我沒急著談生意,因為我沒權力做事,”林伯特說。返回德州提供新數據后,林伯特獲得授權開始談判勘探權合同。

林伯特舉出大量油井勘探失敗的例子,推動并最終簽下了條件非常有利的合同。埃克森美孚獲得的斯塔布魯克地塊比墨西哥灣石油地塊平均面積大1000多倍。合同規定不用預付款,如果埃克森美孚真的開采出石油,可在扣除成本后保留50%的利潤。公司只用向政府支付1%的特許權使用費。后來圭亞那政府因這份合同受到嚴厲批評。“一段時間以來,我一直在捫心自問,但覺得自己沒有做錯,”林伯特說,“按照當時我們了解的情況以及未知狀況來說,合同并無不妥。”

另一方面,這筆交易確實幫助了政府。圭亞那與東邊的蘇里南和西邊的委內瑞拉都存在嚴重的邊界爭端。與埃克森美孚結盟意味著與圭亞那為敵就是與全世界最強大的石油公司為敵。

圭亞那的擔心也不無道理。蘇里南炮艦曾將另一家石油勘探公司驅離兩國有爭議的水域。有八年時間,埃克森美孚無法在該地塊勘探。2007年蘇里南沖突快要解決時,埃克森美孚的高管們才發現還要出資研究地震才能滿足合同要求。高管們建議放棄該地塊,騰出現金給巴西、墨西哥灣和美國新興頁巖盆地更重要的勘探工作。

工程師迪斯穆克曾在德州接受教育,當時擔任埃克森美孚西半球商業顧問,看到與圭亞那簽署的合同后他簡直不敢相信自己的眼睛。林伯特談判達成的協議對公司非常有利。迪斯穆克和同事提出了一項外包協議,將部分地塊轉給愿意為地震研究付費的公司。埃克森美孚的管理層批準了,2008年將斯塔布魯克25%的份額賣給了殼牌。接下來三年里埃克森美孚和殼牌解讀了從地下巖層反彈的地震波從而了解當地的地質情況。初步獲得的數據很樂觀,跡象顯示存在化石燃料。

但數據也證實了很多地球科學家最擔心的問題:完全沒有構造圈閉。構造圈閉是指地質斷層或非常堅固的巖石帶,就像大壩一樣,石油經過數百萬年滲入沉積層時可將其捕獲。如果沒有堅固的圈閉層,石油就無法大量積聚,也就沒有商業價值。圭亞那只有地層圈閉,對石油勘探來說在所有地質構造中風險最大。雖然地層圈閉很安全,但不容易發現,很難在地震圖上分析。而且這種構造通常包含所謂的 "盜油區",石油可能從中漏出。

到了2000年代末期,石油行業開始熱衷勘探地層圈閉。當時原油價格超過每桶100美元,如果能有大發現就意味著巨額利潤。技術也在不斷進步。殼牌決定將在斯塔布魯克地塊的份額增加到 50%。大約同一時間,休斯頓一家小型勘探公司APA(當時還叫阿帕奇)兩位地球科學家也在密切關注著相關消息。 上世紀90年代蒂姆·奇索姆曾在埃克森美孚研究過委內瑞拉,而巴勃羅·艾斯納在西班牙雷普索爾工作時曾常駐該地區。兩人都想去斯塔布魯克分一杯羹,發現沒機會后,就帶阿帕奇公司進入了蘇里南。

還沒來得及鉆井,阿帕奇公司管理層改變主意裁撤了勘探團隊。不到半小時奇索姆和艾斯納就遭解雇。奇索姆去了赫斯,艾斯納則加入了中海油。兩人都感覺有工作沒做完。

2013年,員工人數達7.5萬的埃克森美孚只有一位地球科學家全職負責圭亞那。殼牌資助的地震研究提供了大量數據。埃克森請澳大利亞地球科學家戴克斯特豪斯協助解讀。他說,大學時就很熱愛這一學科,因為 "涵蓋了所有科學領域",包括地震建模物理學和研究數百萬年前生物的古生物學。"最后研究石油和天然氣,就會面臨真金白銀的決策,"他說。

從墨爾本抵達休斯頓后不久,戴克斯特豪斯就要做決策了。彼時埃克森美孚持有斯塔布魯克十多年,為了要不要在面積堪比馬薩諸塞州的某處打下直徑8英寸的鉆孔已糾結數月。

種種跡象顯示沒必要。埃克森更重視已發現石油的地方,而殼牌在法屬圭亞那鉆探失敗后,對當地也興趣漸失。戴克斯特豪斯開始分析約五年前獲得的二維地震數據。一處名叫Liza的勘探區引起了注意。從數據來看存在流體。是什么流體?是水還是石油?他的上司就不確定性不斷提出挑戰。

通過復雜的計算機建模,戴克斯特豪斯綜合了300多張三維地震圖像,認為很可能是水面上的石油。"研究越多,我越是覺得'那里有東西',”戴克斯特豪斯說。2013年底,他和兩位同事向埃克森十多位頂級地球科學家展示了發現。

好消息是,Liza有90米(295英尺)厚的 "含油層",里面布滿了多孔的沙子,流體很容易通過。他們估計可能石油含量可能有8.9億桶,當時價值近10億美元。預測上限是這一數字的兩倍。壞消息是成功幾率只有22%,主要原因是Liza是地層圈閉。老板并未認可,三人只得鎩羽而歸。

會上坐在后排的迪斯穆克看法有所不同。“我當時想,如果圈閉勘探成功,按照條件非常有利的合同還能繼續勘探600萬英畝的地塊,”他說。他制定了跟2008年類似的計劃,即尋找愿意為油井勘探支付大量資金換取份額的合作伙伴,從而降低財務損失。當然,如果埃克森美孚沒把風險分出去,現在賺得只會得多。埃克森美孚石油生產主管馬龍表示,公司機會很多,沒必要在一口井上押數億美元。“不能光說不練,”他說,“到底是對還是錯?都是基于當時了解的情況做的決定。”

管理層批準后,埃克森美孚迅速在休斯頓的Greenspoint辦公室成立數據室,邀請了約30家石油公司,大概20家出席。各利益相關方的地球科學家坐了整整一天聽埃克森美孚團隊介紹,第二天又分析了數據。赫斯最后一個表示贊成。奇索姆盤問了戴克斯特豪斯兩個多小時。“他做得很好,沒有夸大其詞,”2020年奇澤姆在的一次演講中提到,“對我來說,這一點非常重要。他真的充滿熱情。”

2014年年中,赫斯正考慮投資該地塊時,殼牌拋出了重磅炸彈:為地震數據支付了六年費用后,這家超級巨頭想退出。殼牌回答提問時表示,做出這一決定是因為“對前沿勘探資產采取了廣泛審查”。此時埃克森美孚擁有斯塔布魯克100%的份額,距離通知圭亞那政府鉆探與否只剩下幾周時間。

在赫斯內部,投資圭亞那的決定很難推動,但最終該公司同意持有30%。“我把職業生涯都賭上了,”奇索姆說,“如果沒成功,我肯定會被炒魷魚。”

早在阿帕奇與奇索姆共事時,艾斯納就對圭亞那垂涎三尺,此時他已加入中海油。"各方都有機會投資斯塔布魯克,但需要見解獨特且頭腦靈活的地質學家拍板,甚至把桌子砸了喊'贊成',"他說。“在中海油,我就是這樣的角色。”艾斯納說服了老板,中海油買下25% 的份額。埃克森在斯塔布魯克的份額降到45%,但關鍵的是,兩家新加入的公司同意承擔油井大部分成本。由于埃克森美孚資金安全無虞,管理層同意鉆探Liza。

這口油井耗資2.25億美元。盡管到最后埃克森將在圭亞那項目的投資達250多億美元,但熟悉內情的人士稱,埃克森最初的支出,也就是確保對該重大發現享有控制權的支出與2013年相信圭亞那潛力的一群人提出的零支出非常接近,只花了不到1億美元。實際可能還不到這個數字。

埃克森請了泛洋鉆探設備公司(Transocean Ltd.)的 "深水冠軍 "鉆井平臺。這臺高規格的鉆機長度堪比兩個足球場,可裝載10卡車的水泥和泥漿,鉆井深度超過7英里。直升機機組和支援船只隨時待命,所以油井每天成本很快就超過100萬美元。

在埃克森內部,這口油井被稱為 "地獄之井"。一段管道卡住沒法上下移動,影響了整座油井。鉆井工人只得切斷鉆頭,用水泥填滿井底。過程中損失了價值超過1500萬美元的設備。但鉆探人員打出一個側鉆孔,挽救了整個項目。在 Liza正式開鉆前一天晚上,戴克斯特豪斯和同事在埃克森新建的休斯頓園區兩間會議室里席地而睡。

2015年5月5日,鉆頭扎進Liza,休斯頓的實時油井數據顯示巖石密度出現突變。這意味著Liza井下有大量化石燃料。但當時還不清楚是石油還是天然氣。要想真正成功,必須是石油。

幾個小時后,“深水冠軍“鉆井平臺的甲板上泥漿循環,不斷把石頭甩到傳送帶上。戴克斯特豪斯的老板,也是資深地球科學家凱里·莫蘭德突然在咸咸的海風中聞到一股熟悉的氣息。“有點像加油站的味道,”她說。她戴上手套,撿起了一些石頭。石頭上,烏黑的石油滴滴滑落。(財富中文網)

譯者:梁宇

審校:夏林

Scott Dyksterhuis was convinced. Or as convinced as you can be when predicting what lies more than 3 miles beneath the seabed. The then 32-year-old geoscientist for Exxon Mobil Corp. figured there was a good chance a vast trove of oil lay buried off the coast of Guyana, near where the Atlantic Ocean meets the Caribbean Sea. Now came the hard part. He had to persuade his bosses to drill a well that would prove it. “It was high-risk,” -Dyksterhuis says. “But Guyana was a casino you wanted to play in because when you win, the profits are so high.”

In late 2013 hunting for oil in Guyana was among Exxon’s lowest priorities. Companies had drilled more than 40 dry holes in the region. The target formation—named Liza, after a local fish—was under a mile of water, and drilling it would cost at least $175 million. Even Dyksterhuis estimated there was only a 1 in 5 chance of success. But if he was right, it would open an oil frontier, proving a theory that the same geology behind Venezuela’s reserves, the world’s largest, extended across the north coast of South America. Many at Exxon had no interest in making that bet. Neither did much of the rest of the oil industry.

Today, Liza is the world’s biggest oil discovery in a generation. Exxon controls a block that holds 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil, worth nearly $1 trillion at current prices. The find has transformed Guyana from one of South America’s poorest countries into one that will pump more crude per person than Saudi Arabia or Kuwait by 2027. Guyana is on track to overtake Venezuela as South America’s second-?largest oil producer, after Brazil.

Guyana has become the bedrock of Exxon’s post-Covid corporate revival. The Texas oil giant has a 45% share of a field that costs less than $35 a barrel to produce, making it one of the most profitable outside of OPEC. With crude currently trading at $85 a barrel, the oil field would make money even if the transition from fossil fuels caused demand to collapse and prices dropped by half.

The untold story of the Guyana find’s origins—based on interviews with more than a dozen people involved in the Liza well, most of whom have since left Exxon—reveals some surprising truths about oil’s past and future. It shows how others in the business overestimated the shift from oil to renewables. Only three years ago, Exxon lost a battle over board seats with activist investors who argued it wasn’t doing enough to prepare for the transition. Exxon stuck to its core business. “When everyone else was pulling back, we were leaning in,” says , president of Exxon’s production division. Since Guyana production began at the end of 2019, the company’s shares have more than doubled, the highest return among its supermajor peers.

This history suggests the difficulty of relying on market forces to usher in the end of fossil fuels. The Green movement had hoped that improved technology would help solar, wind and other renewables supplant increasingly hard-to-find oil. Environmentalists now worry that Exxon will earn a windfall from a slower energy transition, while others bear the cost of drilling’s harm to the climate and Guyana’s ecology. “Exxon is polluting the ocean and atmosphere without having to pay for the damage,” says Melinda Janki, a Guyanese lawyer who’s worked on international environmental protection. (Exxon says it invests in technology to protect the environment and meets or exceeds regulatory requirements.)

Exxon’s rivals no doubt have aching regret. Almost 30 other companies, including Chevron Corp., passed up the chance to buy into the Guyana discovery. Shell Plc, previously a 50% partner, walked away. Chevron is now paying $53 billion for Hess Corp., one of Exxon’s two partners in Guyana, which has a 30% stake in the project. Exxon this year filed an arbitration case against Hess, claiming it has a right of first refusal over the stake. (Hess says that right doesn’t apply in a merger.)

But the tale of the Guyana discovery isn’t about taking swashbuckling risks for a huge payoff. Exxon, it turns out, is as much a financial engineering company as an oil explorer. It hedged its bets, reduced its exposure and bought itself an option to make a fortune on an unlikely outcome.

That strategy dates to a key moment in 2013. Exxon’s top geoscientists concluded that Dyksterhuis and his colleagues hadn’t made the case that drilling Liza was worth the risk. Dyksterhuis was downbeat. If it didn’t drill, Exxon would have to hand the Stabroek block, or concession—its license to explore and drill the territory—back to Guyana’s government within months. (Stabroek was the former name of Guyana’s capital, Georgetown.)

In the hallway after a meeting, Rudy Dismuke, a ?commercial adviser, pulled one of the geoscientists aside. “Would you support Liza if we could drill it for free?” he asked. “Of course,” the geoscientist replied.

And so a small group of lower- and midlevel employees figured out a way to drill for nothing. Or close to it.

Like many geoscientists Rod Limbert knew that the source rock for Venezuela’s oil—the La Luna formation—extended under the Atlantic into maritime territory held by Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana. The straight-talking Australian became fascinated with an onshore discovery in Suriname in the 1960s, when villagers accidentally found what became a billion-barrel oil field while drilling for water in a schoolyard.

Limbert thought the schoolyard’s oil had originated off Guyana’s continental shelf and migrated more than 100 miles onshore over millions of years. He took the idea to the Exxon team responsible for entering new basins in mid-1997. “They had a picture of a downward-pointing thumb at the end of their presentation,” Limbert says. He contacted Guyana’s government about acquiring drilling rights anyway. “I just didn’t tell anyone,” he says.

In 1997, Guyana was one of the poorest countries in South America, still suffering from the socialist and isolationist policies of strongman Forbes Burnham, who rose to power soon after independence from the UK in 1966. Limbert and two colleagues flew from Houston to Georgetown, to acquire old well logs and discuss the potential for drilling rights with the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission. “The ground floor was literally the ground floor,” Limbert says. “By that I mean the desks and chairs were on the dirt.”

The Exxon team also met Samuel Hinds, Guyana’s president, who talked mostly about cricket, Guyana’s national pastime. “I wasn’t in any particular hurry to talk about business, because I had no authority to do anything,” Limbert says. On returning to Texas and armed with fresh data, Limbert won permission to begin contract negotiations for exploration rights.

Citing the legions of failed wells, Limbert pushed for and won a highly favorable deal. The Stabroek block offered to Exxon was more than 1,000 times bigger than the average oil block in the Gulf of Mexico. It required no upfront payment, and if Exxon struck oil, the company would keep 50% of the profit after deducting costs. It would pay the ?government a royalty of only 1%. Guyana later received heavy criticism for the contract. “I have examined my conscience about it over a period of time, but I don’t feel bad about it,” Limbert says. “It was a complete fit for what we knew and what we didn’t know.”

The deal helped the government in another way. Guyana faced serious border disputes both with Suriname to the east and Venezuela to the west. Aligning with Exxon would mean anyone picking a fight with Guyana would also be picking a fight with the world’s most powerful oil company.

Guyana’s concerns proved valid. Suriname gunboats forced a different oil explorer out of disputed waters between the two countries. Exxon couldn’t work on the block for eight years. When the Suriname conflict was nearing resolution in 2007, Exxon executives realized they’d need to spend money on seismic studies to meet work requirements under the contract. They suggested giving up the block to free up cash for -higher-priority explorations in Brazil, the Gulf of Mexico and emerging US shale basins.

Dismuke, a Texas-schooled engineer who was Exxon’s Western Hemisphere commercial adviser at the time, took one look at the contract with Guyana and couldn’t believe his eyes. The deal Limbert negotiated had a huge upside. Dismuke and a colleague suggested a farm-out deal that would hand a portion of the block to a company willing to pay for the seismic study. Exxon’s management approved the idea and sold 25% of Stabroek to Shell in 2008. Exxon and Shell spent the next three years interpreting the seismic waves bounced off underground rock layers to understand the region’s geology. The early data was promising, showing indications of fossil fuels.

But this data also confirmed many geoscientists’ worst fear: a complete absence of structural traps. These formations are geological faults or impenetrable bands of rock that act like dams, capturing oil as it seeps through layers of sediment over millions of years. Without a solid trap, oil can’t accumulate in large enough quantities to be commercially viable. Guyana instead had stratigraphic traps, the most risky of all geological formations for an oil explorer. Although they can be secure, stratigraphic traps are subtle and very difficult to analyze on seismic charts. They often contain what’s known as a “thief zone” from which oil can escape.

By the late 2000s, however, the oil industry was warming to such formations. Crude was trading for more than $100 a barrel, so big discoveries meant big profits. Technology was improving. Shell decided to raise its stake in the Stabroek block to 50%. Around the same time, two geoscientists at APA Corp., a small explorer in Houston then called Apache, were watching closely. Tim Chisholm studied Venezuela for Exxon in the 1990s, and Pablo Eisner had worked the region for Repsol SA. The pair wanted a slice of Stabroek, but when that wasn’t an option, they led Apache into Suriname instead.

Before they could drill a well, Apache management had a change of heart and cut its exploration team. Chisholm and Eisner were laid off within a half-hour of each other. Chisholm went to Hess and Eisner joined CNOOC. Each says they believed they had unfinished business.

At Exxon in 2013 one geoscientist in a company of 75,000 people worked full time on Guyana. A trove of data was coming from the Shell-financed seismic studies. Exxon turned to Dyksterhuis, the Australian geoscientist, to help interpret it. He was drawn to the subject in college because it had “every single field of science in it,” including the physics of seismic modeling and the biology of creatures that had died millions of years ago, he says. “And then you go into oil and gas, you’ve got, like, big-dollar decision-making.”

One such decision came soon after Dyksterhuis arrived in Houston from Melbourne. Exxon, which by then had held Stabroek for more than a decade, had a matter of months to decide whether to drill an 8-inch-diameter hole somewhere in an area the size of Massachusetts.

Signs pointed to no. Exxon was more focused on established oil provinces, and Shell was souring on the region after drilling in French Guiana didn’t pan out. Dyksterhuis started analyzing two-dimensional seismic data shot about five years earlier. One prospect, Liza, stood out. The readings showed fluid. But what kind? Water or oil? The uncertainty prompted constant challenges from his bosses.

Using complex computer modeling, Dyksterhuis combined more than 300 3D seismic images to determine it was likely oil sitting on top of water. “The more I worked it, the more I was, like, ‘There’s something going on here,’ ” Dyksterhuis says. Toward the end of 2013, he and two colleagues presented their findings to more than a dozen of Exxon’s top geoscientists.

The good news was that Liza had a “pay zone” 90 meters (295 feet) thick packed with porous sand that fluids could move through very easily. They estimated it could contain 890 million barrels of recoverable oil, worth almost $1 billion at the time. Their high-side estimate was twice as big. The bad news was there was only a 22% chance of success, mainly because Liza was a stratigraphic trap. It wasn’t enough to win the bosses’ approval, and the trio left discouraged.

Dismuke, who sat at the back of the meeting, saw it differently. “I thought, if this hits and the trap holds, then I’ve got 6 million more acres to explore under a very good contract,” he says. He made a plan similar to the approach in 2008: reduce the financial downside by finding partners who would disproportionately pay for the well, in return for a stake in the block. Of course, Exxon would now be far richer if it hadn’t laid off that risk. Mallon, the Exxon oil production chief, says it would have been inappropriate to bet hundreds of millions of dollars on a single well, given the company’s many other opportunities. “You can’t sit as an armchair quarter?back,” he says. “Was it right or wrong? It was the decision based on what we knew at the time.”

Management approved, and Exxon quickly set up a data room at its Greenspoint office in Houston, inviting about 30 oil companies. Only about 20 showed up. Geoscientists from each interested party got a daylong presentation from the Exxon team and a second day to analyze the data. Hess was the last to come through. Chisholm grilled Dyksterhuis for more than two hours. “He did a very good job of, I would say, not overselling it,” Chisholm said in a 2020 lecture. “That was very critical to me believing. He had passion for what it was.”

In mid-2014, as Hess was considering entering the block, Shell dropped a bombshell: After six years of paying for seismic data, the Anglo-Dutch supermajor wanted out. The decision was “part of a broader groupwide review of our frontier exploration portfolio,” the company said in response to questions. Exxon now had 100% of Stabroek and only weeks before it had to inform the Guyana government whether or not it planned to drill.

Within Hess, Guyana was a tough sell, but the company agreed to take a 30% stake. “I bet my career on it,” Chisholm says. “I would have definitely been fired if it had not worked.”

Eisner, who’d coveted Guyana since working with Chisholm at Apache, was now working at CNOOC. “Everybody was offered Stabroek, but you need a maverick, big-headed geologist banging the table, even breaking the table to say, ‘This is good,’ ” he says. “At CNOOC, that was me.” Eisner convinced his bosses, and CNOOC took a 25% stake. Exxon’s share of Stabroek was now 45%, but crucially, the two newcomers agreed to fund most of the well cost. With Exxon’s own money now largely protected, management gave the go-ahead to drill Liza.

The well cost $225 million. Though Exxon will end up investing more than $25 billion in the Guyana project, its initial outlay—the one that secured its control of the epic discovery—was pretty close to the zero that the small group of Guyana believers had mentioned back in 2013: less than $100 million, according to people familiar with the matter. Possibly much less.

Exxon hired Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Champion for the job. The high-spec drill rig was as long as two football fields, carried 10 truckloads of cement and mud, and could drill more than 7 miles deep. With helicopter crews and support vessels at the ready, the well was soon costing more than $1 million a day.

Inside Exxon it was dubbed “the well from hell.” A section of pipe got stuck, unable to move up or down, compromising the integrity of the entire well. Drillers sheared off the drill bit and filled the bottom section of the well with cement. They lost equipment worth more than $15 million. But the drillers made a side-track hole that saved the project. The night before Liza reached its target, Dyksterhuis and a colleague slept on the floor in separate meeting rooms at Exxon’s newly built Houston campus.

As soon as the drill bit hit Liza on May 5, 2015, real-time well data being fed back to Houston showed a sudden change in rock density. That meant Liza was stacked with fossil fuels. But it wasn’t immediately clear whether it was oil or gas. To really hit the big time, it had to be oil.

A few hours later, the Deepwater Champion circulated drilling mud on its deck and shook out rock cuttings onto a conveyor belt. Kerry Moreland, a senior geoscientist and Dyksterhuis’ boss, noticed a familiar smell in the salty sea air. “Maybe like a gas station,” she says. She put on gloves and picked up some of the rocks. They were dripping in oil.

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